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Reese: The Surface Owner's Estate Becomes Dominant: Wyoming's Surfact Ow

THE SURFACE OWNER'S ESTATE BECOMES
DOMINANT: WYOMING'S SURFACE
OWNER CONSENT STATUTE
In 1973, as part of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, Wyoming passed a surface owner consent law.'
1.

§ 35-11-406(b) (x-xii) (1977), as amended (1978).
(b) The application shall include a mining plan and reclamation plan
dealing with the extent to which the mining operation will disturb,
change or deface the lands to be affected, the proposed future use
or uses and the plan whereby the operator will reclaim the affected
land to the proposed future use or uses. The mining plan and reclamation plan shall be consistent with the objectives and purposes of
this act and of the rules and regulations promulgated. The mining
plan and reclamation plan shall include the following:
(x) For a surface mining operation granted a new permit
after July 1, 1973, and prior to March 1, 1975, except for
an operation legally operating under the 1969 Open Cut
[Land] Reclamation Act, an instrument of consent from
the surface owner, if different from the mineral owner,
to the mining plan and reclamation plan. If consent cannot be obtained as to either or both, the applicant may
request a hearing before the environment quality council. The council shall issue an order in lieu of consent if
it finds:
A. That the mining plan and the reclamation plan
have been submitted to the surface owner for
approval;
B. That the mining plan and the reclamation plan
is detailed so as to illustrate the full proposed
surface use including proposed routes of egress
and ingress;
C. That the use does not substantially prohibit the
operations of the surface owner;
D. The proposed plan reclaims the surface to its
approved future use, in segments if circumstances permit, as soon as feasibly possible;

WYO. STAT.

(xi) For an application filed after March 1, 1975, an instrument of consent from the resident or agricultural landowner, if different from the owner of the mineral estate,
granting the applicant permission to enter and commence
surface mining operation, and also written approval of
the applicant's mining plan and reclamation plan. As
used in this paragraph "resident or agricultural landowner" means a natural person or persons who, or a
corporation of which the majority stockholder or stockholders:
A. Hold legal or equitable title to the land surface
directly or through stockholdings, such title
having been acquired prior to January 1, 1970,
or having been acquired through descent, inheritance or by gift or conveyance from a member of the immediate family of such owner; and
B. Have their principal place of residence on the
land, or personally conduct farming or ranching
operations upon a farm or ranch unit to be
affected by the surface mining operation, or
receive directly a significant portion of their
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This law requires applicants for mining permits after
March 1, 1975, to have the written consent of the surface
landowner, if the landowner owned the land before January
1, 1970, before the state will issue the applicant a mining
permit.2 If the surface landowner is not a resident or agricultural landowner or acquired his title after January 1,
1970, the mining permit applicant can receive a permit
without the surface owner's consent if he meets the criteria
set forth in Section 35-11-406(b) (xii) of the Wyoming

Statutes.
Wyoming's surface owner consent law has the practical
effect of reversing the legal position of the surface owner
and the mineral estate owner. Before the statute was passed
the mineral estate had always been held to be the dominant
estate while the surface estate was considered the servient
estate. Now the surface owner, at least those who owned
their land before January 1, 1970, is in the dominant bargaining position. According to this statute, no mining can
be done on such lands without the surface owner's consent;
therefore, mining permit applicants have no choice but to
meet the demands of the surface owner.
1. Continuedincome from such farming or ranching operations..
(xii) For any application filed after March 1, 1975, including
any lands privately owned but not covered by the provisions of subdivision (b) (xi) of this section an instrument of consent from the surface landowner, if different
from the owner of the mineral estate, to the mining
plan and reclamation plan. If consent cannot be obtained
as to the mining plan or reclamation plan or both, the
applicant may request a hearing before the environmental quality council. The council shall issue an order
in lieu of consent if it finds:
A. That the mining plan and the reclamation plan
have been submitted to the surface owner for
approval;
B. That the mining plan and- the reclamation plan
is detailed so as to illustrate the full proposed
surface use including proposed routes of egress
and ingress;
C. That the-use • does- not substantially prohibit the
I operations of the surface owner;
D. The proposed plan reclaims the surface to its
.approved future use, in segments if -circumstances permit, as soon. as feasibly possible.
2. WYO. STAT. -§ 35-11-406(b) (xi) (1977, as amended 1978).
3. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co.,v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1928).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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This comment will discuss the constitutionality of Wyoming's surface owner consent law in three areas. The first
is whether Wyoming's statute is an unconstitutional taking
without compensation of the dominant position of the mineral estate holder. The second theory will be that the federal
government has preempted the area of mineral lands regulation and therefore Wyoming's statute is void. The third
theory is that Wyoming's statute is unconstitutional because
it denies equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This comment will deal
primarily with the reservations of mineral rights under
lands the federal government disposed of to private interests. It will not deal with reservations of mineral estates
by private parties.
The Wyoming Surface Owner Consent Statute
Wyoming's surface owner consent law makes no distinction between federal, private or state owned mineral
estates and surface estates.' Section 35-11-406(b) (xi) of
the Wyoming Statutes defines "surface owner" very narrowly. The surface owner must be both a resident or agricultural landowner and have owned the land since January
1, 1970.' Under this section the surface owner's consent is
absolutely required.' Section 35-11-406 (b) (xii) of the Wyoming Statutes on the other hand includes all surface owners.
However, this section provides fewer protections for the
surface estate owner. Under this section if the mining
applicant cannot obtain surface owner consent, the applicant may request a hearing before the environmental quality
council.' The council shall then issue an order in lieu of
consent if it finds:
(A) That the mining plan and the reclamation
plan have been submitted to the surface owner
for approval;
(B) That the mining plan and the reclamation
plan is detailed so as to illustrate the full pro4. WYO. STAT. §§ 35-11-103(e) (xi) (1977), 35-11-401(a), 35-11-405(a) (1977).
5. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-406(b) (xi) (1977, as amended 1978).
6. Id.
§ 35-11-406(b)
(1977, as
amended 1978).
7. Wyo.
Published
by LawSTAT.
Archive
of Wyoming(xii)
Scholarship,
1981

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 5

544

LAND AND WATER LAW REvEw

Vol. XVI

posed surface use including proposed routes
of egress and ingress;
(C) That the use does not substantially prohibit
the operations of the surface owner; and
(D) That the proposed plan reclaims the surface
to its approved future use, in segments if
circumstances permit, as soon as feasibly
possible."
Therefore, under Section 35-11-406(b) (xii) of the Wyoming Statutes the only real protection for the surface owner
is subpart (C) above. This leaves the mineral estate owner
in the dominant position when it comes to bargaining. However, subpart (xii) (c) is a significant increase in the protection of the surface owner. Prior to this statue, Wyoming
case law 9 and Federal statutes" had held that "In the absence of proof of negligent mining operations . . .the sur-

face owners... can recover only for damages to agricultural
improvement or agricultural crops."" Thus subpart (C)
above at least signifies that no lawful operation of the
surface owner can be destroyed without compensation by
the holder of the mining permit.
The Effect of the Surface Owner Consent Statute
In Wyoming, prior to passage of the surface owner
consent statute, the rule concerning federally reserved minerals was that, "Where ... the United States reserves the

mineral estate, together with the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same in a grant of the surface estate, there
is a servitude laid on the surface estate for the benefit of
the mineral estate."' 2 Approximately twelve percent of the
State of Wyoming was affected by this rule.'" In the entire
United States, "as of 1972, surface patents with minerals
reserved to the United States had been issued under the
8. Id.
9. Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798 (Wyo., 1955).
10. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of Dec. 29, 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970);
Agriculture Entry Act of July 17, 1914, 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-123 (1970);
Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1970).
11. Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., supra, Note 9, at 804.
12. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878, 882, 883
(10th Cir. 1974).
13. Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 10 LAND & WATE L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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various surface entry acts affecting 62, 872, 663 acres of
land."14 The federal rule essentially paralleled the common
law rule:
The owner of a severed mineral estate has long
been characterized as 'dominant' in relation to the
owner of the surface estate. The general rule today,
with certain exceptions is as follows:
The [mineral] owner has the right to mine
even though the grant or reservation contains no
express mining clause. The right to mine . . . is

incident to the ownership thereof; he has the right
to use the surface in a manner fairly necessary to
the enjoyment of the mineral estate. When a thing
is granted, all the means to obtain it and all the
fruits and effects of it are also granted.15
While the mineral estate owner can use whatever means are
reasonable and necessary to extract the minerals, he must
show due regard for the rights of the surface owner." As
a result of the conflicting rules there has developed an
"Uncertainty over rights to use or destroy the surface
[which] has caused conflict between more and more mineral
and surface owners, fomenting litigation and discouraging
the full development of either mineral or surface estates."1 7
The federal law has the same uncertainty; "No cases have
been found which directly decide whether a reservation of
coal under the 1909 or 1910 Acts or of all minerals under
the 1916 Act entitles the United States or its lessees to mine
coal by surface mining methods."' 8 One observer noted that,
The legal staffs of most of the coal development
companies must also feel an uncertainty about the
rights of the surface owner to block surface mining.
Acting on their counsel, many energy companies ...

have purchased ranch lands in fee, leases author14. Id.

15. Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and
Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 872 (May, 1980).

16. Id. at 871.
17. Id.

18. Haughey and Gallinger, Legislative Protection of the Surface Owner in the
Surface Mining of Coal Reserved by the United States, 22 ROCKY MTN.
MN. L. INST. 145, 149 (1976).
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izing surface mining and options to lease or purchase. . . . "'9
Thus while the mineral estate owner appeared to be in a
dominant position before the surface owner consent law,
as a practical matter the "mineral owners

. .

• often opted

for the-expediency of paying the surface owner for his
cooperation." ' The Wyoming surface owner consent law
may not have had that much practical effect, except that
the mineral owner who is determined to press his advantage
is no longer able to do so. Moreover, the statute puts the
surface owner in the driver's seat. So, whereas before the
mineral estate owner could press his advaitage to the
detriment of the surface owner, now the reverse is true.
Perhaps that is as it should be since, of the two, the mineral developer is usually in the better position to purchase
the rights of the other.
Constitutionality Under Traditional Law
a) The Unconstitutional Taking of Private Property Without Just Compensation Theory.
Under the traditional tests for determining whether
the use of the police power by the state to take private
property was constitutional, the Wyoming surface owner
consent law would probably have been unconstitutional. The
traditional rules were that the exercise of the police power
is presumed to be constitutionally valid and the presumption
of reasonableness is with the State.2 ' Further it was held
that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition
and such a characterization does not determine whether or
not an ordinance is constitutional.2" However, the traditional
test also stated that "the deprivation of -the former owner
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking.""3 Thus, in the case of surface
owner consent laws the courts need not find that the State
19. Id. at 150.
20. Mall, supra note 13, at 1.

21. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962).
22. Id. at 592.

v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).

23. United States
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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has taken the rights of the mineral estate but they need
merely find that the State has caused the mineral estate
owner to be deprived of his rights. The only factor left to
determine under the traditional test would be whether or
not the dominant position of the mineral estate is a property
right. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, when a mining
claim is perfected it is a grant of exclusive possession by
the United States.24 Just compensation must be paid to take
it away. The Court has also held that,
One fact for consideration in determining [the]
limits [of the police power] is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
the act.25
This latter statment came in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
where a Pennsylvania statute had given surface owners the
right to subjacent support even if the severing of the mineral estate had expressly taken this right away. The Court
went on to hold in that case that, "To make it commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."2 And, further, "So far as private persons or
communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only
surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk
has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater
rights .... " 7 Thus it appears that following this same traditional thinking the Wyoming surface owner consent law
would be held to be unconstitutional.
b) Federal Preemption of the Regulation of Mineral Lands
Prior to 1977.
The theory of federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause28 of the federal constitution. The traditional
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Wilbur v. United States, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 416.
U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
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tests are first whether the area covered is in its nature
national or a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.29 If the subject is in its nature national, it may
properly be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." If, however, it is a field which the States
have traditionally occupied:
we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.... Such a pur-

pose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme
of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it ....

Or the

Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject ....

Likewise, the

object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. .. . Or the state policy may

produce a result inconsistent with the objective of
the federal statute. 1
If the proposition that, "The control of public lands
is vested exclusively with Congress"32 is accepted, the discussion should end and the State surface owner consent
statute would be ruled unconstitutional. However, it can be
argued that the surface estate is privately owned and the
control of this land is a field that has traditionally been
occupied by the States. Furthermore, "None of the (federal)
acts specifically authorized surface mining or clearly expressed an intent that the surface might be destroyed by
the mining operator."3 3 Thus it appears that the States may
be able to legislate in this area.
However, not everyone accepts this theory:
Certainly federal laws governing reserved minerals
29. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
30. Id. at 625.
31. Id. at 633, quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
32. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr McGee Corp., supra note 12, at 882.
33. Haughey and Gallinger, supra note 18, at 153.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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have preemptive capability. Both the means and the
end of the legislative scheme lie within the parameters of legitimate federal concern. The subject
matter is federal land and the regulation of it is
entrusted to Congress. The purpose of the regulation is federal whether one perceives the laws as
concerning simply the disposition of federal land or,
more broadly, as furthering interstate commerce.
There is little room for debate whether the
state laws conflict with the federal legislation. The
surface entry acts contain relatively explicit provisions for mineral entries. None of those provisions
allows the surface owner to deny access ....

The

entire thrust of the surface entry acts is to provide
a means for access to these public minerals which
is not subject to denial. 4
Another, somewhat milder, theory accepts that there can be
some State legislation in the area of mining reserved minerals but still feels States may not be able to legislate in
this whole area:
It

. .

. appears accepted that the police power of

a state extends over the public domain at least
where no recognizable harm to a federal interest is
present. On this basis, much of the existing state
legislation which deals with reclamation of surfacemined lands would appear constitutionally supportable. It does not follow, however, that the 'veto'
provisions of these enactments are sustainable on
the same ground. 5
Therefore, it seems that prior to 1977, Wyoming's surface
owner consent statute might have been held to be unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine.
Surface Owner Consent as a Violation of Equal Protection.
The traditional equal protection test is first to determine if the statute classifies into different groups," and
c)

84. Mall, supra note 13, at 51-52.
85. Haughey and Gallinger, supra note 18, at 190-191.
U.S. 106 (1949).
York, 3361981
v. New
Agency
86. Railway
Published
by Law Express
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then to determine if there is a reasonable and legitimate
state interest, which is met by the statute." The obvious
classification by the Wyoming Surface Owner Consent law
is into surface estate owners and mineral estate owners.
Once the classification is established the court must determine the level of scrutiny to be used in determining whether
the classification is acceptable. To determine the level of
scrutiny the court looks for a suspect class or a fundamental
interest.3 8 Obviously, in this case there is no suspect class
or fundamental interest so the court would then try to determine if there is a reasonable and legitimate state interest.
To determine what the purposes of the statute are the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that a court may look at the purposes as stated by the legislative body which passed the
statute.39
The purposes of the Wyoming Environmental Quality
are enumerated in Section 35-11-102 of the Wyoming
Statutes. This section 4' states that the purposes of the act
are to allow the state to (a) combat pollution, (b) preserve
the environment of Wyoming, (c) plan the development, use,
reclamation, preservation and enhancement of the resources
of the state, (d) preserve and exercise the rights and responsibilities of the state, and (e) retain control over its
environment and to secure cooperation with other governments in carrying out these objectives. 2 It has been held
that,
Act4 °

A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to
be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the
public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the
owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it,
37. Id.
38. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); University of
Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
39. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-101 et. seq. (1977).
41. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-102 (1977).
42. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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but is only a declaration by the State that its use by
any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.43
Looked at very simply the Wyoming surface owner consent
statute might be considered constitutional. However, based
on the above quotation the only purposes in the Wyoming
Statute which can withstand any level of scrutiny are those
designed to protect the public health and safety. Since Wyoming's statute neither prohibits mining completely on this
land nor achieves the purposes stated in Section 35-11-102
of the Wyoming Statute, even the public health and safety
purposes can not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Wyoming will deny the mining permit if the applicant
does not receive surface owner consent.4" Providing for surface owner consent, however, does not promote any of the
purposes stated in Section 35-11-102 of the Wyoming Statutes. To place a private individual in a better bargaining
position does not protect the public health and safety. In
fact, "the consent of the surface owner bears no rational
relationship to environmental conservation . . . [its] primary purpose and effect ... is to change the relative legal
rights and economic bargaining positions of many private
parties . . . rather than to achieve any public purpose.","
Besides not fulfilling the purpose set out by Wyoming statute the surface owner consent statute doesn't protect the
public; "[a] source of damage to . . . [private property]
is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted
on others in different places. The damage is not common
or public."4 " Therefore, it seems clear that Wyoming's surface owner consent law generally is unconstitutional in that
it does not protect a public interest nor does it achieve the
results the legislature supposedly intended for the Environmental Quality Act.
43. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, supra note 21, at 593.
44. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-406(b) (xi) (1977, as amended 1978).
45. Haughey and Gallinger, supra note 18, at 178, quoting from Mugler v.
Kansas. 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
46. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, upra note 25, at 413.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 5

552

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

Changes In The Taking Theory
As noted earlier, this author felt that the Wyoming
surface owner consent was unconstitutional under traditional concepts of taking of private property without compensation by the government. However, in the last few
years the United States Supreme Court seems to have made
a significant change from the traditional interpretation of
takings under this doctrine. The Court held that, "this Court
quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons."47 In the same case the Court
made it clear that the standard of review had changed; "in
instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded
that 'the health, safety, morals or general welfare' would
be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses
of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that
destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property
interests."4 From this it appears clear that the Court will
now view constitutional challenges based on uncompensated
taking in a manner very deferential to the states. It seems
that the state will need only show that the regulation is
reasonable. The Court reinforced this new theory when it
held that, "the denial of one traditional property right does
not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."" The Court in
that case went on to say that, "It is, to be sure, undeniable
that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of
appellees' property. Again, however, that is not dispositive.
When we review regulation a reduction in the value of the
property is not necessarily equated with a taking."5 The
new theory undoubtedly would find the Wyoming Surface
47.
48.
49.
50.

Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id. at 125.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
Id. at 66.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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Owner Consent law constitutional when the final element
is added:
A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. 5'
The new deferential attitude of the Court towards state
regulation should certainly lead to a finding that the Wyoming surface owner consent statute is constitutional. The
statute merely affects one "strand" of the mineral owner's
bundle of property rights,"2 the cost of obtaining access, and
while this takes away the most profitable use of the mineral
estate owner's property, there is no physical invasion of the
mineral estate owner's property by the government. The
Wyoming Legislature has merely acted in this case to shift
"the benefits and the burdens of economic life" by making
the surface owner's estate the dominant estate.
Federal Preemption After 1977
As a result of new federal statutes and regulations and
as a result of a change in the way the United States Supreme
Court looks at preemption, the Wyoming surface owner consent law would probably be held to be constitutional. In 1977
the federal government passed the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act. 3 Section 1253 of the chapter grants,
"Each State . . . which wishes to assume exclusive jurisdic51. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C.. supra note 47, at 124 (citation omitted).
52. The exception to this statement is the landowner who refuses to sell under
any circumstances. This is, obviously, a destruction of the mineral estate
owner's whole "bundle" of property rights. Because of the Court's deferential scrutiny in the taking area such a possibility should not affect the
decision on constitutionality.
53. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. I 1979).

(a) Each State in which there are or may be conducted surface coal
mining operations on non-Federal lands, and which wishes to
assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal
mining and reclamation operations, except as provided in sections
1271 and 1273 of this title and subchapter IV of this chapter, shall
submit to the Secretary, by the end of the eighteenth month period
beginning on August 3, 1977, a State program which demonstrates
that such State has the capability of carrying out the provisions
chapter....
Published by of
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tion over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations ...shall submit to the Secretary ...a State
program which demonstrates that such State has the capability of carrying out the provisions of this chapter."54
Wyoming's program was accepted and became effective February 1, 1977.11 The cooperative agreement provides in
Article IV (B) (1) (a) 5" that "an operator on Federal lands
must submit a single application, which . ..must include
the following information:
1. The information required by, or necessary for
the State Regulatory Authority and the Secretary to make a determination of compliance
with:
(a) Wyoming State Statutes sections 35-11406(a), (b) (i) - (ix) and (xiii) - (xviii)
and (c) ."
This rather noticeably skips Wyoming's surface owner consent provisions and could be interpreted to mean that the
federal government did not approve of surface owner consent as a requirement in submitting a mining application.
However, Article IV(B)(4) requires that, "If the State
Regulatory Authority requires the operator to submit additional information, the operator shall submit the information."58 Thus, it appears the State can impose additional
requirements, especially when it is recalled that Title 30,
Section 1253 of the United States Code states that states
with cooperative agreements would assume "exclusive jurisdiction" over surface coal mining. Furthermore, the federal
government passed a surface owner consent statute in
1977."9 This statute states that, "The Secretary shall not
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
30 C.F.R. § 211.77 (1977).
Id.
Id.
Id.
30 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 1979).
(a) The provisions of this section shall apply where coal owned by the
United States under land the surface rights to which are owned
by a surface owner as defined in this section is to be mined by
methods other than underground mining techniques.
(c) The Secretary shall not enter into any lease of Federal coal
deposits until the surface owner has given written consent to enter
and commence surface mining operations and the Secretary has
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enter into any lease of Federal coal deposits until the surface owner has given written consent."" ° This statute includes a broad definition of "surface owner."'" A surface
owner is one who holds title to the land surface, lives on
the land or conducts farming or ranching operations on the
land or receives a significant portion of his income from
such farming or ranching operations, and has met the above
conditions for at least three years.6" Accordingly it does not
appear that Wyoming's surface owner consent law conflicts
with the federal law, at least as to coal mining. Therefore,
the Wyoming Statute would not be preempted as far as
surface coal mining. 3 But under the traditional preemption
theory Wyoming's law still could be preempted based on the
pervasive scheme of the federal regulation. However, there
seems to have been a shift in the method used by the United
States Supreme Court to determine preemption by the federal government.
"In 1973, just as the federal presumption had acquired
the veneer of doctrinal permanence, the Court abruptly began to change direction. In a series of decisions . .

.

the

59. Continuedobtained evidence of such consent. Valid written consent given by
any surface owner prior to August 3, 1977, shall be deemed suficient for the purposes of complying with this section.
(e) For the purpose of this section the term "surface owner" means
the natural person or persons (or corporation, the majority stock
of which is held by a person or persons who meet the other requirements of this section) who-1. hold legal or equitable title to the land surface;
2. have their principal place of residence on the land; or personally conduct farming or ranching operations upon a farm
or ranch unit to be affected by surface coal mining operations; or receive directly a significant portion of their income. if any, from such farming or ranching operations; and
3. have met the conditions of paragraphs (1) and (2) for a
period of at least three years prior to the granting of the
consent.
In computing the three-year period the Secretary may include periods
during which title was owned by a relative of such person by blood
or marriage during which period such relative would have met the
requirements of this subsection.
60. Id.
61. 30 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (Supp. I, 1979).
62. Id.
63. It can be argued that the federal statute on surface coal mining grants,
by analogy, the same rights to the states in regulating the surface mining
of other leaseable minerals. However, locatable minerals such as uranium,
which can be also surface mined, are probably not includible even by
analogy. The discussion which follows in the text seems to me to be
applicable to both lease and locatable minerals, and thus the determination
of constitutionality -should not be affected by the different manner in which
the right to mine is obtained.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 5

556

LAND AND WATER LAw REvIEw

Vol. XVI

Court once again incorporated a solicitude of state interests
into its preemption inquiry.""4 Following Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange,65 the Court said "the proper approach
is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with
one another rather than holding one completely ousted."6
In another case from the same period the Court held that:
"Where coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a
complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption
becomes a less persuasive one."67 This latter statement seems
especially appropriate since Wyoming and the federal government have made a cooperative agreement whereby Wyoming is to have exclusive control in the area of surface coal
mining permits. Finally the Court held that, "State or local
legislation, to be preempted, must be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant."' s There doesn't appear to be
any construction of the Wyoming surface owner consent
statute and of federal law which would make the Wyoming
statute "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant."6 Under the Court's apparently new interpretation
of federal preemption the Wyoming surface owner consent
statute is clearly constitutional.
Equal Protection
Of the three constitutional doctrines examined in this
comment, the equal protection doctrine is the one which
puts the Wyoming surface owner consent law in the greatest
danger. Using this doctrine a Kentucky court in 1975 found
Kentucky's surface owner consent law unconstitutional.
64. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives On Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 639 (1975).
65. Silver v. New York stock exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
66. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973).
67. New York State Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973).
68. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973), quoting from Hamilton,
The Federalist, No. 32.
69. Id. The exception to this broad statement is Section 35-11-406(b) (xi) of
the Wyoming Statutes which requires ownership in the family prior to
January 1, 1970. This provision contradicts the federal statute which only
requires ownership for three years prior to the lease. Thus this section of
the Wyoming Statutes appears to be unconstitutional. It is recommended
that this section be amended to remove such an arbitrary cut-off date and
a set time limit be substituted. There appears no reasonable purpose behind
a permanent cut-off date of January 1, 1970.
70. Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection v. No. 8
Limited of Va., 528 S.W. 2d 684 Ky., 1975).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/5
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That court held that the Kentucky law did "no more
than delegate to an individual . . . a veto over the use of
land... ."I' It went on to hold that the surface owner con-

sent statute, "delegates to countless private individuals who
own interests in surface estates from which the mineral has
been severed the right to undo whatever environmental conservation purpose the legislation may have by granting their
consent, for a consideration, to surface mining on their
land. It is beyond cavil that the primary purpose and effect
of [the statute] is to change the relative legal rights and
economic bargaining positions of many private parties...
rather than achieve any public purpose."" This is the equal
protection argument which might prevail unless we add in
the fact that Kentucky is not a state which has the extensive
federal public lands found in western states, such as Wyoming. In the Kentucky case the severance of the mineral
estate from the surface estate occurred by private deed,"
whereas in the west the severance has primarily occurred
as a result of reservation of the mineral estate by the federal government." The federal government then leases the
mineral estate to a private developer. It seems clear that
equal protection doesn't enter into such a transaction, so
that the federal government is free to set any lawful requirements it sees fit in its granting of a lease. Thus as far
as federal coal is concerned it appears that Wyoming's surface owner consent law is not unconstitutional as being a
violation of traditional equal protection.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming surface owner consent statute is constitutional, at least as to the "taking" doctrine, federal preemption and equal protection. The effect of this statute is
that in Wyoming the surface estate has become dominant
over the mineral estate. Before this statute the mineral
estate owner could make any reasonable use of the sur71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 686.
Id. at 686-87.
Id.
This comment deals only with mineral estates-reserved by the United States
leased
to private
parties.Scholarship, 1981
Publishedlater
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face owner's estate necessary to obtain the minerals, with
or without any bargaining with the surface owner. However, as a practical matter, the mineral estate owner normally tried to obtain the surface owner's estate so as to
avoid any conflicts.
Now, the surface estate owner is in a position where
he doesn't have to rely on the goodwill or fear of the mineral
estate owner. If the mineral estate is truly valuable, then
its owner is certainly in a position to buy out the surface
estate owner. If the mineral estate is not valuable enough
to make it economically worthwhile to buy out the surface
estate owner, then the mining of such an estate should not
be allowed to interfere with the superior use of the land by
the surface owner.
If the above conclusions are accepted, then it appears
that Wyoming's.. surface owner consent statute is an equitable and reasonable solution land.
to the inevitable conflict bein
estates
separate
the
tween
THOMAS REESE
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